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THE CUNNING OF REASON:
MICHAEL KLARMAN’S THE FRAMERS’ COUP
Charles Fried*
The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Consti-
tution. By Michael J. Klarman. Oxford and New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 2016. Pp. xiii, 631. Cloth, $39.95; Paper, $24.95.
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good
for them or good for society. Those failures—joined with the similar fail-
ures of others—can readily have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. Under the Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its
commerce power to compel citizens to act as the Government would have
them act.
That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned.1
Introduction: The Framers’ Intent
What was the country the Framers of our constitution envisioned?
Michael Klarman,2 in his magisterial, comprehensive, and meticulously doc-
umented The Framers’ Coup: the Making of The United States Constitution,
answers that question—at least if “the framers” (or Framers) is a designa-
tion that comprehends the masters of the process that led to the drafting and
adoption of the document that was transmitted by the Philadelphia Conven-
tion to the Confederation Congress in 1787, then forwarded to the thirteen
states for their consideration in conventions specially to be created by the
state legislatures for that purpose, and ratified by those conventions in all
states but Rhode Island by 1789. (Rhode Island ratified in 1790
(pp. 529–30).) Though many remarkable men participated in that process,
including passionate but ultimately defeated opponents, the undoubted
masters of the conception, formulation, and defense of the Constitution of
1789 were Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Standing behind them
* Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank my colleagues Annette
Gordon-Reed, Kenneth Mack, Bruce Mann, and John Manning for comments and suggestions
and Samantha Miller of the Harvard Law School class of 2019 for research assistance.
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.) (explaining why in his view the mandate in the Affordable Care Act is not authorized by
the Commerce Clause).
2. Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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at every stage with lesser eloquence but unparalleled judgment, commit-
ment, and prestige stood the guiding spirit of George Washington,3 who had
been the president of the Philadelphia Convention.
The precarious journey, from the contested authority of the Philadel-
phia Convention to act at all to its triumphant outcome in 1789, that Klar-
man presents in riveting detail shows beyond all doubt that these master
Framers were determined to overcome the populist dislike, born of the spirit
of the Revolution of 1776, of strong government in general and of a strong
national government in particular. Following the work of Gordon S. Wood
and many others,4 Klarman shows how these Framers overcame the populist
democratic sentiment—a sentiment animating majorities in every state. Al-
though this is an oft-told tale, Klarman’s narrative has the suspense and
tradecraft of the best adventure thrillers. He shows how the Framers in 1789
caused the emergence of a structure of government that was strongly cen-
tralized—or at least designedly carried the seeds of strong centralization in
it—and that leaned heavily in the direction of institutionalizing government
by a small elite, presided over by a strong executive embodied in a single
dominant personality. All this was accomplished against a general sentiment
favoring a pervasive localism, which dispersed power first to the states and
then further dispersed it to localities, the limitation of all governmental
powers at every level, and the further dispersion of actual authority to legis-
latures in which each legislator represented a relatively small constituency.
This last feature—together with provisions for recall and binding instruc-
tions, short terms of office (in many states legislative elections were annual),
and term limits—was all designed to keep legislators closely bound to the
popular will and to obviate the development of a professional cadre of rulers
(p. 173). State executives, such as governors, also enjoyed short terms of
office and were often restrained by an elected or appointed executive council
(pp. 213–14). Analogous provisions were pressed in the Philadelphia Con-
vention (pp. 171–76).
This was anathema to the Framers. Theirs was a maximalist vision. The
Framers succeeded in pressing for a numerical limit on the number of mem-
bers of the House of Representatives, thereby assuring representatives with
larger, more diverse districts (pp. 171–73). The representatives’ terms were
two years, but with no mandatory rotation in office, no recall, no binding
instructions (pp. 244–45). When it came to the Senate, the Framers (or
some of them) pressed for seven-year or even life terms—staggered to assure
3. See Gordon S. Wood, The Inventor of the Presidency, N.Y. Rev. Books (May 25,
2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/05/25/George-washington-inventor-of-the-presi
dency/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (reviewing T.H. Breen, George Washing-
ton’s Journey: The President Forges a New Nation (2016)).
4. See Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution,
1787–1788, at 229–31 (2010). See generally Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (1996); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation
of The American Republic, 1776-1787 (1998); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution (1992).
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a more limited turnover at each election (pp. 209–11). And as for the execu-
tive, the focus of the popular and probably majority antipathy to concen-
trated power (like the classical Roman odium nominis regis),5 here the
Framers moved in quite the opposite direction. They pushed for a president
who would serve a long term in office—some initially proposing seven-year
terms, some even life terms (pp. 228–29)—with all executive power, includ-
ing that of commander-in-chief (Hamilton’s “unitary executive”)
(pp. 237–38). From the outset, the Framers initially sought this—what its
opponents called monarchic and aristocratic—government, not the limited
powers accorded to the Continental Congress, which were conceived as
those of a confederation of sovereigns.6
Though this concentrated, nationalist conception was in the course of
the Convention adjusted and compromised in several respects, the linea-
ments of our present government are clearly discernible. As what emerged
from the Convention and was later ratified in the states ran counter to the
nation’s majority preference for a dispersed, populist, and popular structure
of government, Klarman’s characterization of this outcome in the title of his
book as The Framers’ Coup seems altogether correct. The arguments that the
Affordable Care Act’s invocation of this conception “is not the country the
Framers of our Constitution envisioned”7 and that it would “change[ ] the
relationship of the Federal Government to the individual in a very funda-
mental way”8 seem, if not rhetorical excesses, at least considerable
exaggerations.9
Klarman’s meticulous and exhaustive documentation is a signal feature
of this definitive work, as is his predilection for developing his account so far
as possible out of the mouths of the participants themselves.10 Indeed, Klar-
man hardly takes notice of the dispute about the accuracy of Madison’s
5. See Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American
Founding ch. 5 (2014) (pointing out that educated persons were well aware that there were
elected monarchs, like the king of Poland, the Holy Roman emperor, and, of course, the pope).
Edmund Randolph called this a “foetus of monarchy.” Id. at 188.
6. See pp. 155–56, 213.
7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. 519 (No. 11-
398).
9. See p. 241. At the outset, Hamilton contemplated doing away with the states’ rights of
sovereignty altogether. See generally Rakove, supra note 4, at 11, 65 (discussing law office
history as compared to “real” history).
10. Klarman briefly describes the factors that limit our knowledge of what happened at
the Philadelphia Convention. “[T]here was no stenographer present,” he notes, “unlike as at
some of the state ratifying conventions . . . .” P. 135 n.*. And he details the difficulties in final
reliance on Madison’s notes. Yet the Convention laid down a voluminous and various record.
Several of the other delegates kept more or less detailed notes, which they did not scruple to
make public soon after the event. Many delegates wrote lengthy letters about the proceedings
while they were going on. And there were endless journalistic accounts, some of which re-
ported firsthand accounts from the delegates. These are all exhaustively mined and set out in
the notes, which together with the bibliography comprise almost two hundred pages. This
work was surely immeasurably assisted by the recently completed twenty-eighth volume of The
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notes of the debates in the Philadelphia convention (pp. 392–93). That
Madison took such notes daily during the Convention is not disputed.
Whether he had altered these notes to accord more with his later avatar as a
defender of states’ rights, strict construction—especially of the grant of
powers to the national government—and in general as a stalwart lieutenant
of Thomas Jefferson’s conception of popular government and as Jefferson’s
protégé and successor is more controversial (pp. 135–36, 229, 384, 737
n.300). There are those who contend that Madison was a sincere and princi-
pled supporter of states’ rights, limited government, strict construction of
the powers of Congress, and a restrained view of the role of the executive
and that he had fallen in with Hamilton’s more consolidating and monar-
chical views out of necessity to save the Convention altogether.11 Klarman’s
account, without explicitly entering into that dispute, as it mainly relates to
developments after 1789 and the end of his story, leaves little doubt that this
account of Madison as a consistent man of principle—or the same princi-
ples—is hardly plausible.12 It was Madison who in the Virginia Plan pro-
posed a general veto somewhere in the national government of any state
legislation (pp. 139–40). If there could be any doubt that Madison became a
different man in the years after 1790 as the relations between France and
Great Britain heated up and Jefferson’s opposition became more pro-
nounced, Mary Sarah Bilder’s recent Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitu-
tional Convention puts paid to those revisionist contentions. Bilder shows
that Madison either altered or replaced his contemporaneous notes so that
his own speeches to the Convention would be more in accord with his bur-
geoning Jeffersonian bent.13 In any event, as I say, Klarman makes little of
Madison’s later change of heart and is able to rely on multiple sources to tell
his story. The account I give in the next Parts takes Klarman’s story to be as
well-founded as his exhaustive documentation can offer.
Documentary History of the Ratifications of the Constitution, released on April 15, 2017. Pauline
Maier’s superb Ratification, on which Klarman evidently draws heavily in his chapter 6, did
not have the benefit of the completed compilation. Pp. 737–95.
11. See, e.g., Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the
Founding of the Federal Republic 1–10 (1995).
12. It is one of the signal virtues of Noah Feldman’s excellent new biography, The Three
Lives of James Madison: Genius, Partisan, President, that he acknowledges without equivocation
the radical shift in Madison’s views on states’ rights and national powers from Convention and
pre-Convention writings to his stance as a leading figure of the newly formed Republican Party
and the principal associate of its leader, Thomas Jefferson. Noah Feldman, The Three Lives
of James Madison: Genius, Partisan, President (2017). On the former, see Madison’s
correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, in which he states that “he intended ‘to arm the fed-
eral head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local legislatures.’ . . . Congress must
either dominate the states or be dominated by them.” Id. at 101 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in2 The Writings of James
Madison 324, 326 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). On the latter, see Feldman’s discussion of the
Alien and Sedition Acts and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Id. at 416–21.
13. See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional
Convention 186–201, 214–20 (2015).
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The reliability, objectivity, and good faith of Klarman’s account are un-
derwritten by a remarkable fact: Klarman is no fan of the centralizing, elitist
tendency of the Federalist project and its outcome. The very title of the book
attests to that—a coup after all is not a celebratory sobriquet. I am reminded
of a discovery made in reading The Travels of Marco Polo. The author records
so many marvels in his fourteenth-century account of his travels to a world
almost wholly unknown to Europeans that one grows skeptical of his claim
to firsthand experience. So when toward the end of his narrative he tells of
his encounter (in what today is known as Sumatra) with a unicorn, I
thought, Aha, now I got you, here is the thirteenth chime of this particular
clock—until I read on to his description of the graceful, mythical beast:
[Having] hair like that of a buffalo, feet like those of an elephant, and a
horn in the middle of the forehead, which is black and very thick. . . . The
head resembles that of a wild boar, and they carry it ever bent towards the
ground. They delight much to abide in mire and mud.14
And then I realized that Polo was telling the truth in much the same way as
it dawned on me how much Klarman’s sympathies lay with the populist,
democratizing majority. Any skeptical doubts of the accuracy of his narra-
tive dissipated—to him this was not a triumphalist tale. Klarman ends his
epic account of those three years on a distinctly sour note:
In the final analysis, the Constitution—like any governmental arrange-
ment—must be defended on the basis of its consistency with our basic
(democratic) political commitments and the consequences that it pro-
duces. That it has been around for a very long time or that its authors were
especially wise and virtuous should not be sufficient to immunize it against
criticism (p. 631).
In the last Part of this Review I go into the objection of Klarman and
others that our present day Constitution is imperfectly democratic on many
counts—from the way it causes us to be represented in and to our govern-
ment to the power of unelected federal judges to decree what our governing
arrangements shall be—intimating that these defects, if such they are, can be
traced to the work of the Framers, to their coup of 1787–1789. And such a
14. 2 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo 285 (Henry Yule & Henri Cordier
trans., The Complete Yule-Cordier ed., Dover Publ’ns 1993) (1477). I cannot here forbear to
quote, with her kind permission, my favorite poem about this animal by the poet Gjertrud
Schnackenberg, although it is an admitted diversion:
Why does a rhino’s horn exist?
Its not to hang your trousers on!
Its not for digging up the lawn,
Or prying open birthday gifts.
I think its there for keeping track
Of which is “front” and which is “back”.
Since either end is Very Large,
It helps us know which end will charge!
Poem by Gjertrud Schnackenberg (on file with author).
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fairly straight line can indeed be drawn. The interruption of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, by adding to the powers of Congress and the federal
courts at the expense of the states (and making good in part on the premise
if not the promise of equality in the Declaration of Independence), only
makes that line heavier and more distinct. It is a remarkable story for that
very reason. And this is where I differ from Klarman’s splendid account,
with whose trajectory I agree entirely—except that what it deplores I
celebrate.
To understand what Madison, Hamilton, and Washington accom-
plished, it is necessary to dwell in some detail on the drama of the Conven-
tion and the Ratification: these were the quintessentially Enlightenment
foundry from which the steel filaments guiding and strengthening us to this
day were drawn. The Framers were exceptionally clearheaded, as their words
which Klarman quotes repeatedly show. They were also excellent politicians,
knowing how to take advantage not only of their opponents’ weaknesses but
of their own strengths and most of all their good luck. So it is a story about
these to be sure, and that is why in Klarman’s telling it is such a good story.
But it is a tale of discovery as well: the discovery of the axioms, theorems,
and lemmas of what at the time was an entire novelty—a republican govern-
ment on a scale grand not only of geography but population. Federalism,
judicial review, and human rights emerged from that foundry and not only
govern us now but instructed the world’s newer republics to come. Clear-
headedness, imagination, and good luck caused, through the Framers’
hands, a system to emerge the stability and humanity of which they could
not possibly have come near to appreciating. But they did it. It was not a
miracle; rather, at work was, in Hegel’s words, “the cunning of reason.”15
I. The Precarious Nation
Most delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and many informed
Americans would agree: the government of the combined thirteen states was
not working. There was no executive, only presiding officers (p. 213). The
subjects the Congress could address were strictly limited to those “expressly”
set out, and many powers were omitted (p. 25). For instance, the Confedera-
tion Congress had no power to regulate trade, so that the states took every
advantage to beggar their neighbors (pp. 21–23). New York had a fine har-
bor, and it charged New Jersey and Connecticut whatever the traffic would
bear in the way of export and import fees.16 Under the Confederation, there
was no authority to regulate trade between the states (p. 21). The national
authority had no power to levy taxes but was limited to levy an assessment
on the states without a corresponding authority to collect that levy
15. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History 30 (Ruben Alvarado
trans., WordBridge Publ’g 2011) (1837).
16. See pp. 21–24. Chief Justice Marshall did not have to stretch far in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824), to interpret the Navigation Act passed by the first Congress as forbidding
such competitive regulation and requiring unencumbered passage in the navigable waters of
the nation.
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(pp. 18–19). National arrears were inevitable and mounting (p. 11). The
payment of Revolutionary War debts was subject to the same infirmity, and
the credit of the nation was gravely impaired.17 The Treaty of Paris, the peace
treaty ending the Revolutionary War, provided for the payment of certain
debts to British subjects, and the British were obliged to vacate western forts
(pp. 11–12). Because there was no federal court system to adjudicate and
enforce payment of these debts, the British felt justified in holding onto the
forts from which they encouraged Indian raids against western settlers.18
There was no national army to enforce the treaty or to protect against Indian
raids, and one could only be raised by a unanimous vote in the Congress.19
States had full power to alter or abrogate public and private debts and to
issue paper money that had to be accepted as legal tender.20 The impotence
of the national government threatened depredations by rival foreign powers
and offered the constant temptation to one or more states to make their own
arrangements and the further temptation that the confederation would pull
apart into one or more regional groupings (p. 48).
Not only was the authority binding the states together weak but there
were also powerful centrifugal forces of all sorts. Madison gives the conflict
between northern and southern states regarding slavery as one of the most
threatening of these (p. 257). That is appropriate given the salience of the
issue in the public mind, to outsiders watching the proceedings from
abroad, and to the decisive role slavery and race played in the next centuries
of the nation’s social, political, and constitutional history. In Klarman’s tell-
ing, the tensions and uncertainties regarding slavery were eclipsed by other
concerns and were relatively readily resolved.21
Much more acute were the economic differences between the various
states and regions.22 Of course, that the South was a source of agricultural
riches and the North of trade and incipient manufactures was tied to the
South’s slave and the North’s free economy. But it was the economic, not the
moral, differences that the Convention had to reconcile. The southern states
had a great interest in free export of their agricultural products and in the
17. See p. 20.
18. See p. 12.
19. See p. 389.
20. See p. 131.
21. Chapter 4; accord Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 238–39 (2004); see
pp. 258–61 (stating that Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island
had significant numbers of slaves); see also Chernow, supra at 210–16, 307 (stating that Ham-
ilton and Franklin, like Adams, were convinced abolitionists but accepted the persistence of
slavery as the price of a successful union).
22. P. 390 (“[T]he principal basis of [Anti-federalists’] opposition [to the Constitution]
seems to have been fear that northerners would control the national government and use its
powers—especially those over commerce and treaty making—to the detriment of southern
economic interests.”). Contra p. 257 (“[The] sectional disparity of interests [between northern
and southern states] ‘resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their [the
states’] having or not having slaves.’ ” (quoting James Madison, Saturday, June 30, 1787, in 1
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966))).
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ability to play various merchant fleets off against each other in order to get
the best deals on carriage (p. 35). But this was a trade that northerners
wished to be able to engross in themselves (pp. 35–36). On the other hand,
northern manufacturers and merchants wanted protection against foreign
competition, an interest directly opposed to that of the agricultural South
(pp. 35, 390–91). The southern states expected increased population and
expansion (pp. 192, 388–89). The northern states, in contrast, underesti-
mated the lure of the Northwest Territories, with the result that northern
interests were always ready to trade off navigation rights on the Mississippi,
which were vital to expanding southern populations, with recognition by the
European powers of their marine interests (pp. 54–56, 389).
Perhaps of overriding importance was the split between the leading citi-
zens from the large cities—Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Charleston—
from whom the Federalist leaders were largely drawn and what was vari-
ously called the frontier, the backwoods, or the up-country (p. 395). The
latter was as much a state of mind as a geographical designation. As Freder-
ick Jackson Turner put it,
[T]he frontier is productive of individualism. . . . The tendency is anti-
social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct con-
trol. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression.23
Not all Federalists came from the large cities: some of the great planters in
the Southern states were leading Federalists and some of the leading Anti-
Federalists, such as Samuel Adams (pp. 380–81) and Melancton Smith,24
were large city dwellers. And of course there was the ambivalent figure of
Jefferson, whose ideological sympathies embraced many of those of the
frontiersmen, but who was a cosmopolitan through and through.
A final division was between small and large states. New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland were chary
of having their interests swamped (and their leading men deprived of the
status of middling fish in small ponds) by the power and populations of
Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts (pp. 14, 422–23). Of
these, Rhode Island was a kind of reductio ad absurdum; not only was it
minuscule but it also contained in microcosm the divisions found in the
larger states.25
Against this background, the Confederation Congress first authorized a
convention to be held in Annapolis, and after the failure of that project, in
Philadelphia, to propose changes to the Articles of Confederation (pp. 101,
110).
23. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in
The Frontier in American History 1, 30 (1921).
24. Robert H. Webking, Melancton Smith and the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 44
Wm. & Mary Q. 510, 511 (1987).
25. See pp. 517–18, 520.
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II. The Philadelphia Convention
The general sense of dissatisfaction had matured into something border-
ing on panic when Shays’s Rebellion in central Massachusetts made manifest
the growing dilapidation of governmental authority at every level
(pp. 90–92, 117). It was not just an arcane plot by Hamilton, Madison, and
their allies to foist unwanted strong government on an unwilling nation that
led to the calling of the Philadelphia Convention (p. 117).
A good response was guaranteed when Washington was persuaded to
attend as a delegate with the general expectation that he would be asked to
preside over any such more potent body (pp. 112, 122). The game was now
on, and it was clear from the outset that there were two opposing camps:
those who were content to limit the outcome of the convention to some
amendments and enlargements of the Confederation Congress’s powers in
the realm of regulation of trade and to the grant of some form of national
taxing power, and the Federalists’ project (pp. 140–43). It was clear that the
latter would require traveling far outside any authority the Congress could
bestow, as under the Articles any such radical reconceptualization needed to
be guided by the unanimity of state legislatures to which it would have to be
submitted (pp. 140–42). And this was the constant objection thrown up
against the work of the Federalists—that it was unauthorized, illegitimate—
both by those who disliked the whole elitist, nationalizing, government-em-
powering project altogether and those who had limited but deep objections
to particular aspects of the Federalist project (pp. 141–44).
Madison arrived in Philadelphia with a plan (pp. 133, 137–38, 597). He
envisioned a great and general enlargement of the powers of the national
legislature to all matters that may affect the interests of the nation as a
whole—powers to be expansively interpreted, rather than limited as under
Articles of Confederation (pp. 129–33). The national government would be
empowered to act directly on the people and not only through the states; the
national government would have the authority to preclude any contradiction
or even interference with exercises of national power (pp. 139–40); there
would be a bicameral legislature—one house more popular and subject to
more frequent elections, the other more insulated from popular pressure by
its smaller number, longer terms of tenure, and indirect election by the state
legislatures—with both houses to be apportioned by population (p. 139);
there would be a unitary and energetic executive (Hamilton’s terms) to be
similarly insulated from popular pressures by longer terms in office and in-
direct election;26 and finally, there would be a federal judiciary to adjudicate
claims and conflicts touching on national concerns (pp. 137–41). These
were the main features of what was known as the Virginia Plan
(pp. 138–39). Obviously this far exceeded any project merely to amend the
Articles and could not be achieved under the Articles’ requirement of unani-
mous adoption by then-thirteen state legislatures (pp. 141–43, 239). These
26. Pp. 140, 214–15, 218; see p. 48.
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were the stated grounds of objection of its principal opponents (pp. 141–43,
239).
That the final document (and indeed our present charter of govern-
ment) hews so closely to the Virginia Plan—for which Madison was largely
responsible (pp. 37, 133, 137–38)—is a testimony to Madison’s tactical ge-
nius and the strategic flexibility of the principal Federalists. As set out ini-
tially, there was much to divide the twelve delegations and their members:
the representation of the large and small states, the treatment of slavery, the
terms of admission of new states, the powers of the chief executive, the treat-
ment of the differing economic interests of the regions, the assurance that
national legislation would prevail over state interference, the nature of the
federal judicial power (pp. 139–41, 200–03). Madison was heartened that at
the very outset it seemed the delegation from Pennsylvania—the second
most populous state after Virginia with the most populist constitution of
any of the states (pp. 127–28, 428)—was in accord with his plan (p. 134), as
were Washington and Jefferson (pp. 128–129). As Klarman points out, both
design and luck played a role in this. The Convention took place in Philadel-
phia, which was less accessible to those who may have opposed the plan,
favoring the Federalists in the various state ratifying conventions (pp. 247,
406–07, 610).
In the Confederation Congress, each state’s delegation had one vote; the
delegates were sent by their respective state legislatures, and amendments to
the Articles of Confederation had to be unanimous.27 This was exactly what
a gathering of sovereigns would look like, and indeed the Articles provided,
“Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”28 This was at the
heart of what Madison and the Federalists were determined to exchange for
a truly nationalist, “consolidated” government, and the lawmaking authority
was the place to start.29 By virtue of what became Article I, Section 8, the
new national legislature was not to be limited to the powers explicitly set
out, many of which in any event were expressed in very general terms
(pp. 146–47). That it should be bicameral seemed quite natural: the state
legislatures of all but Pennsylvania and Georgia were bicameral (p. 169). A
national legislature with such broad and overriding powers was certainly
central to the Federalist project, but I would not call its ultimate attainment
a coup. The sense was general that the existing confederation-of-sovereigns
model would end in the ultimate disintegration of the union and the failure
of the great republican project of the Revolutionary War; but the Federalists
Framers were clearheaded and resolute enough to see and embrace the en-
tailments of that general understanding.
What turned out to be the main impediment on the way to a “consoli-
dated” nation was the vast disparity in size, prominence, and population
27. P. 25; Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V.
28. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II.
29. See pp. 140–41.
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between the smaller and the largest states (p. 182). Certainly Madison began
with a notion of population-based representation in both houses (p. 182).
Indeed, many delegates from the more populous states insisted on represen-
tation according to population (pp. 184–85). But Connecticut, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware were obdurate: they simply
would not participate if they were to be submerged in the mass of the more
populous states (pp. 188–94). The leading Federalists believed the smaller
states would make good on their threat to quit the Convention. Madison
and Washington concluded—surely rightly—that a draft subscribed to by
only eight states (Rhode Island was presumed to be equally recalcitrant)
simply had no chance of being accepted by the Congress and no chance of
there being ratified by state conventions.30 But the threat was graver than
that. The threatened defection would have led to the breakup of the union
altogether, especially as there was talk of these states returning to the British
fold, thus putting at naught the whole revolutionary project.31 It was at the
point of impasse that Roger Sherman of Connecticut offered what was rep-
resented as a compromise: the House would be apportioned according to
population but each state would have two seats in the Senate—the system we
enjoy today (pp. 190–96).
Once the Federalists signaled their willingness to accept the Connecticut
Compromise, the smaller states—though they may have shared some of the
unease about several aspects of the Federalist project—were quite content to
fall into line with the Federalist program (p. 205). For instance, many dele-
gates objected to Hamilton’s “monarchical” conception of the chief magis-
trate (pp. 222–26, 228–29), but the method ultimately proposed of choosing
the president32 so greatly favored the interests of the smaller states that they
did not persist in any principled objection they might have had to the con-
ception of the office. And in a remarkable amalgam of principle with contin-
gency, once this obstacle had been cleared the spirit of accommodation
seemed to infuse the Convention, leading to many distinctive and perhaps
anomalous features, some of which are with us still. Of the many seemingly
irresolvable points of contention, none was more fraught than disagree-
ments about slavery (p. 257). Strategic compromises on this issue, which
some might have thought would satisfy no one, were readily accepted: the
southern states got the Fugitive Slave Clause, Article IV, Section 4, and what
looked like a commitment that the national government if called would aid
in putting down a slave insurrection (or depredations by Indian tribes in the
southwestern hinterlands); slaves would count as three-fifths of a person in
making up their representation in the House; Congress could not interfere
with the slave trade for twenty years—but could and did ban it after that
(pp. 269–71, 291–94). Virginia and Maryland were quite content with this,
as they expected to become chief suppliers of enslaved persons to the states
further south as their own agricultural needs waned (pp. 278–79, 284, 291).
30. See p. 250.
31. See pp. 193–94.
32. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
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They would become breeders of slaves and—as the expression went—would
“sell them down the river” to Georgia, the Carolinas, later to the new states
to their west, and, after the Louisiana Purchase, across the Mississippi
River.33
As a result of skilled oratory, persuasive substantive argumentation, but
most of all deft compromises, most of the delegates, northern and southern,
eventually fell into line behind the Federalists on one after another of what
had seemed peculiarly divisive issues (pp. 239–41). The delegates agreed to
grant authority to the national government to impose taxes directly on the
people, the most pressing aspect of the general principle that the national
legislature could regulate and impose obligations directly on the people
(pp. 239–40). The new legislature would have the authority—which they
exercised at the first opportunity34—to institute a federal judiciary. Recall
Frederick Jackson Turner’s account on the frontiersmen’s view of the “tax-
gatherer . . . as a representative of oppression.”35 A federal judiciary would
now stand behind the federal tax gatherers to enforce their authority
(p. 167). Coming into the Convention, Madison had contemplated giving
the national government a veto on all state legislation but stepped back from
that provocative stance in favor of a supremacy clause which would give the
federal judiciary the general authority to invalidate particular items of state
law as incompatible with federal laws or treaties (pp. 155, 160–61). This led
to some of the most intricate and consequential bodies of federal judicial
doctrine that are with us still.
Similarly on trade, southern delegates, fearing the northerners would
take advantage of their numerical advantage to monopolize for themselves
the crucial carrying trade while bargaining away to Spain the access to the
Mississippi (as John Jay as agent for the Confederation Congress had been
ready to do), had at first insisted that any trade regulation would require
supermajorities in Congress (pp. 390–91). Believing that such a provision
would cripple the national government in its negotiations with foreign pow-
ers, the Federalists persuaded the southern delegates to drop their insistence
on a supermajority requirement for commercial legislation only after north-
ern delegates made concessions on slavery (p. 152) and agreed to bar the
national legislature from taxing exports (a consolation to the exporting
economies of the South) or giving preference to the ports of any state.36
Thus, we have the very broad and general commerce power, which became
the most fruitful font of federal regulation then and ever since.
Subtler touches showed the consolidating hand of the Federalists. For
instance, unlike in the Confederate Congress, the salaries of the members
were to be paid by the national government, not by the states from which
they came (pp. 176–77). Finally, reflecting the horror at the fiscal chaos that
had been a principal impetus for the Convention in the first place and that
33. See p. 291.
34. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79.
35. See supra text accompanying note 23.
36. See p. 287.
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was widely shared by the group of sober and prosperous men gathered in
Philadelphia, the draft precluded the states from passing debtor-relief legis-
lation, which were viewed as laws “impairing the obligation of contracts”
and issuing paper money. It also left the regulation of coinage up to the
national legislature (p. 606). Take that, Rhode Island!
But perhaps the most radical departures from the previous order were
the provisions for putting the draft into effect: It was to be submitted by the
Confederation Congress not to the state legislatures but to ratification in
conventions in the states—entities that did not exist under any of the states’
governing structures. This provision was meant to signal that the Constitu-
tion would emanate from the will of the people and not from the consent of
any sovereign state authority (p. 416). And retreating further from the una-
nimity precept of the Confederation model, the draft would go into effect
upon ratification by nine of the state conventions (p. 413). This was a bril-
liant, risky, and successful tactical move, threatening the recalcitrant by
specifying that the draft would go into effect only for those nine or more
ratifying it (pp. 413–14).
There were objections, but the overwhelming number of the delegates
concurred that this draft was the best that could be done. Moreover, they
succeeded in heading off proposals that the draft only come into effect on
the addition of a Bill of Rights, perhaps to be drafted in a second convention
(p. 565). The Federalist leadership understood that any such conditional or
postponed coming into effect would likely cause the whole finely con-
structed system of compromises to come apart (p. 565). Certainly no second
convention would come as close to the consolidated and elitist structure the
Framers had here obtained. At most, they were willing to assuage those with
reservations by holding out the possibility of subsequent amendment but
after the government structure they now proposed had been set up and was
functioning (pp. 565–66). And on this score, the Framers deployed a bril-
liant and brazen argument. Making a virtue of a vice, they noted that as the
Congress had no authority under the Articles of Confederation to propose
amendments to so radically unconstitutional a document, they persuaded
the Congress to forward the draft to the states “without a syllable of appro-
bation or disapprobation” and that unanimously (pp. 418–22).
III. The Ratifying Conventions
The Philadelphia Convention was, in large part, an elite cabal. The state
ratification conventions were another matter. As Pauline Maier put it in her
detailed and gripping account: Ratification: The People Debate the Constitu-
tion: 1787-1788, the ratification process was the occasion of
one of the greatest and most probing public debates in American history,
one that occurred at the end of the American Revolution and involved far
more than the handful of familiar “founding fathers.” It is the story of how
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“We the People” decided whether or not to ordain and establish the Con-
stitution of the United States.37
The ratification conventions were a far harder test for the Federalists
than was the Philadelphia Convention with its mostly well-educated, upper-
class members drawn from the Atlantic coast cities. The state ratifying con-
ventions were made up of some two thousand delegates from all over the
participating states,38 and they in turn had been elected by an electorate
often broader than that qualified to vote in their own state elections.39 Yet
the Federalists were able to bring it off. Attaining unanimity (with the usual
comedic holdout of Rhode Island) required the same confluence of skills
and good luck as favored the Federalists in Philadelphia—but working over
a longer period of time to influence a far larger target audience in many and
diverse places (p. 540). If the Federalists had been less astute, less eloquent,
or less lucky, the United States would not be what it is today.
A major obstacle was the insistence by many opponents, in good faith
and not so good faith, that so dramatic an expansion of the powers of the
national government carried with it such dangers of overreaching and abuse
that the draft Constitution must not be ratified without the addition of a Bill
of Rights. The Anti-Federalists hoped and the Federalists feared that these
demands would lead to a second convention in which the victories of Phila-
delphia would be undone (pp. 530–31). But the claim had a compelling
logic: after all, many of the states had bills of rights, and there was the al-
most irresistible analogy of the British Bill of Rights of 1689 (p. 552).
Against all this, Hamilton’s response in Federalist 84 seemed rather sophisti-
cal. He argued that first, the draft Constitution already included in Article I
(the Habeas Corpus, the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses) and
Article III (the right in criminal trials to a local jury and the Treason Clause)
the essence of what would be provided in a bill of rights; and second that the
analogy to the British Bill of Rights was inapposite. The British Bill of Rights
was a statement of rights against the crown enacted by the other part of
government, the Parliament, but ours was a government of the people and a
Constitution to be ratified by the people, who did not need a Bill of Rights
to protect them from themselves (pp. 550, 552). Madison in particular was
in a tough spot because he had been an ardent supporter of the June 1776
Virginia Declaration of Rights and of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Relig-
ious Freedom, enacted in Virginia in 1786 (p. 566) and much assisted by
Madison’s 1785 “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments.”40 The pressure for a bill of rights was too difficult to resist. And
37. Maier, supra note 4, at ix.
38. See pp. 417–530.
39. See p. 485 (“While the New York constitution imposed property qualifications for
voting in legislative elections, now, for the first time ever in the state, all free males over the age
of twenty-one would be eligible to vote in the election of ratifying convention delegates.”).
40. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20,
1785), in 8 The Papers of James Madison 295 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (1785).
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Madison, particularly, adopted the strategy of reculer pour mieux sauter, giv-
ing in the Virginia ratifying convention a solemn assurance that once the
Constitution had been ratified and put into effect, the first Congress would
indeed adopt a bill of rights (pp. 591, 593). And that is what happened. The
Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 in the form in which we now know it
(p. 590). So on this matter, astute maneuvering and strategic compromise
removed an obstacle that in any event was a sideshow on the way to the
main event. This is shown by the circumstance that the Speech, Press, and
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which today are among the most
admired, copied, and, consequential provisions in the Constitution, did not
come into their own until well into the twentieth century.
Astute maneuvering, high and low, aided by good luck brought off the
first major victory in the contest for ratification. That Pennsylvania held its
convention in cosmopolitan, mercantile Philadelphia, the seat of arch-Feder-
alists Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson, and not rural Harrisburg, was a
piece of good luck, for ratification on December 12, 1787, by that large and
prosperous state began a cascade of ratifications in other states (p. 430). But
it had taken some extraordinary shenanigans to bring it off. In order to
make up the quorum in the legislature necessary to send the Philadelphia
draft to a convention, two Anti-Federalists, who were lingering in their
boarding house, were “forcibly seized and dragged to the State House by the
sergeant of arms and three men who supported quick ratification of the
Constitution.”41 In Massachusetts, too, something other than logic or per-
suasive rhetoric carried the day. Two old Revolutionary-era warhorses, Sam
Adams (John’s second cousin) and John Hancock—together with the impla-
cable Elbridge Gerry—went into the ratifying convention counting them-
selves Anti-Federalists.42 It looked to be a close thing until, in a timeless
maneuver, the Federalists’ promise to support Hancock for reelection as
governor turned the tide and made Massachusetts the second major state
and the sixth to ratify (pp. 440–42).
New York was a much tougher case: the convention was held in Pough-
keepsie, where the Anti-Federalist governor George Clinton held sway
(pp. 482–85). New York’s rejection would have left a large and irreparable
hole in the middle of the country. It fell into line on June 26 only after the
news that New Hampshire on June 21 and Virginia on June 25 had been the
ninth and tenth states to ratify. So by 1788 it was a done thing (North Caro-
lina ratified in 1789 and Rhode Island in 1790). No apter illustration of the
old saw about the making of laws and sausages than the making of our
Constitution in the two years from 1787 to 1788 can be imagined.
41. Maier, supra note 4, at 64.
42. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 301, 322.
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Conclusion
Veneration of the Framers and of the Constitution they drafted has from
the beginning provoked a strong contrarian current of dissent.43 Contempo-
rary criticism is collected in Sanford Levinson’s Our Undemocratic Constitu-
tion: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can
Correct It).44 The largest target, signaled in the title of Levinson’s book, is the
undemocratic nature of the national government. Of course the United
States is undeniably democratic in the sense that the legislatures and execu-
tives of every state are chosen (gerrymanders aside) on strictly democratic
lines. It is at the federal level that the glaring discrepancies are found. In
1789, a senator from Virginia represented twelve times as many voters as a
senator from Delaware (pp. 626–27). Today, the ratio between California
and Wyoming is more than 65:1 (pp. 626–27). This was by design, justified
then as a necessary concession to the small states. But now? Must a bargain
struck more than two hundred years ago still bind in vastly changed circum-
stances? Klarman, like Jefferson,45 does not think so; on the last page of his
book, he writes, “the Constitution—like any governmental arrangement—
must be defended on the basis of its consistency with our basic (democratic)
political commitments and the consequences that it produces” (p. 631).
But the Connecticut Compromise was not just a bargain; it was a con-
ception. Recall that the original conception of the nation, embodied in the
Articles of Confederation, was something like a multilateral treaty concluded
between independent sovereigns (p. 14). This is not a crazy conception: after
all, the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion are based on some such conception. What stands behind it is a sense of
the value of distinct, indigestible units, each with a distinct character, cul-
ture, perhaps even language. This conception recognizes that cooperation
and coordination between and among sovereigns has great benefits, may
even be critical to preventing armed conflicts destructive to all, while the
unique character of each participant is preserved—a notion collected under
the portmanteau concept of sovereignty. This is not just a quaint or antiqua-
rian interest, as if the natural tendency of all human groupings was to larger
and larger consolidated entities until all peoples were comprehended within
a single world government. For some this may be a dream, but for many it
could be a nightmare.46 Consolidation tends towards homogenization,
43. In Jefferson’s September 6, 1789, letter to Madison, Jefferson mused that “the earth
belongs in usufruct to the living,” and implied that that the newly minted Constitution would
not last longer than a generation. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), in 6 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 3, 3–4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
44. Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitu-
tion Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It) (2006); see also Symposium,
Constitutional Stupidities, 12 Const. Comment. 139 (1995).
45. See generally The Works of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 43.
46. Compare Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of
View, in On History 11 (Lewis White Beck ed., Lewis White Beck et al. trans., Bobbs-Merrill
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bureaucratization, a hyperrationality that drives government away from con-
tact with the sentiments and loyalties of ordinary citizens—not technical
experts in banking, telecommunications, and the like—so that some ideal
notion of democracy and equal representation at the more general level are
in fact incompatible with the real experience of democracy.
Yes, but 65:1—surely that is carrying a good joke too far. Not at all. In
the family of nations, there are small countries and vast ones, and yet we are
committed to the independence, the equal dignity of even the smallest.47
They may not be gobbled up because two adjacent behemoths need to
straighten their borders. It is for this that the term “riding roughshod”
seems to have been invented.
The more one rhapsodizes about the sweetness of diversity, the more
one is brought back in equal measure to the realities that faced the Framers
and led to the strong consolidating tendencies of the Virginia Plan and
Madison and Hamilton’s vision. Practical and commercial interests moved
the Federalists to be sure, but the great men, John Rutledge and the
Pinckneys of Charleton, James Iredell of North Carolina, Madison, Hamil-
ton, Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, John Adams, Benjamin Frank-
lin (“we must, indeed, all hang together or most assuredly we shall all hang
separately”),48 and that hero of equal measures of courage, good sense and
discipline, George Washington—they were all devoted to what the Revolu-
tion had accomplished. They viewed it—rightly—as a new creation on the
face of the earth, a large and powerful republic49 able to take its place among
the great nations of the earth, a gift to humanity and to their own posterity.
They were American patriots; they believed—rightly—that the republic pro-
claimed in 1776 was in imminent danger of dilapidation and disappearance
into the maw of great power politics,50 and they were convinced—rightly
again, I believe—that only the consolidating Constitution of the Philadel-
phia Convention could save the republic.
The central conceptions of the Philadelphia Convention’s draft are with
us still. But it was not the conception with which Madison went into the
Co. 1963) (1784), with Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans.,
Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1957) (1795).
47. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, Para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
48. 1 Benjamin Franklin, The Works of Benjamin Franklin 408 (Jared Sparks ed.,
Boston, Hilliard Gray & Co. 1840).
49. France was a monarchy until August 1792; it would become a dictatorship in 1799
and not again a continuous republic until 1870.
50. See, e.g., pp. 24–25 (“In June 1783, General Washington, in his last official address to
the nation as commander-in-chief, declared that the states must either ‘give such a tone to the
federal government as will enable it to answer the ends of its institution’ or else ‘relax the
powers of the union, annihilate the cement of the Confederation and expose us to become the
sport of European politics, which may play one state against another.’ ” (quoting Letter from
George Washington to Execs. Of the States (June 18, 1783) in 13 The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution 60, 54)).
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Convention. It is the draft that produced the 12:1, now grown to 65:1, dis-
parity that endures. It is a conception that—through the taxing and spend-
ing powers, the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause—has
permitted all the consolidation this continental nation needs, while leaving
distinct political entities with distinct local personalities to grow up and
flourish. Sixty-five to one indeed, but sometimes you have to pay a price for
diversity, distinctiveness. As much as I dislike the aphoristic flights of some
of the Supreme Court’s decisions (Justice Kennedy’s assertion that “[t]he
Framers split the atom of sovereignty”)51—the Court more or less gets the
point of what was accomplished. The opposing views of the Anti-Federalists
presented the Framers with a real antinomy, which they resolved with fi-
nesse and with implications far into a future they could not have foreseen.
The abandonment of Madison’s initial plan for a federal veto of all state
legislation in favor of the subtler doctrinal compromise that emerged from
judicial elaboration of the Supremacy Clause was a better resolution than
the Framers could have foreseen.52 So also still in the bosom of time was the
rich panoply of human rights doctrine that the courts later extrapolated
from the Bill of Rights and especially the First Amendment (pp. 594–95).
With what parts of this does Klarman disagree? Certainly the represen-
tational disparity in the Senate, but he also finds the tenure and the interpre-
tive excursions of the federal judiciary hard to square with democracy (pp.
626–27, 629–30). His critique of the Electoral College (pp. 625–26) seems to
me the hardest to answer. The equal representation in the Senate seems an
important part of a fabric that proclaims and enables the limited but distinct
sovereignty of the states. It allows them a presence that cannot be ignored on
the national scene and offers a platform for local personalities to appear on
that scene, sometimes in postures that transcend their local interests. But the
president has from the beginning been seen as a single personality represent-
ing the whole nation.53 The possibility that because of the vagaries of the
Electoral College a person receiving significantly less than a majority of the
votes of the whole electorate should nevertheless rule in that position is
more than an anomaly; it is a travesty.54
Who can disagree with Klarman that because the Constitution “has
been around for a very long time or that its authors were especially wise and
51. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
52. Pp.158–59. With which Justice Scalia never came to terms and Justice Thomas has to
this day not seen his way to coming to terms.
53. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
54. I also tend to agree with those who would limit Supreme Court Justices to one
twelve-year term. That is long enough to allow them to develop a style and an approach of
their own, while still guaranteeing their independence. It would assure the political system at
regular intervals the occasion to reflect on and redirect the tendencies of the Court. And it
would remove what seems to me the toxic anomaly that life tenure tempts justices to choose
the time of their leaving and so gives them a quite inappropriate role in influencing the choice
of their successors.
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virtuous should not be sufficient to immunize it against criticism”
(p. 631)—especially with the adjectival “sufficient”? Well, maybe I do. Pre-
sent-day democratic sentiments should not control in all respects. The
Framers were like the great mathematicians—Euclid, Pythagoras—who for-
mulated propositions, methods, and proofs that had entailments far beyond
what they envisaged, but because of the clarity and power of their vision
those entailments were indeed implicit in what they offered.55 What is re-
markable about the story Klarman tells is how what the Convention came
up with was not what the Framers had gone in with. Their original plan was
more radical and simplistic than what the various compromises Klarman
recounts forced on them. The result was more novel, surprising, and fruitful
than what they had started with. The objections forced on the Framers the
acceptance of human complexity and the necessity to resolve antinomies
previous theorists had ducked, perhaps just because they were just theorists
not forced to come up with a product or pay a steep price for failure. Lord
Mansfield speaks of “the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn
from the fountain of justice.”56 Ours is in part a common law constitution57
and the best of our judges do just that with the elements the Framers have
handed them. But I prefer Hegel’s: “the cunning of reason.”58
55. Cf. G.H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology (1940).
56. Omychund v. Barker (1744_ 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23; 1 Atk. 22, 23 (emphasis omitted).
57. Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme
Court ch. 1 (2004); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 33–46 (2012); Harry H.
Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of
Adjudication 77–78 (1990).
58. Hegel, supra note 15, at 34.
